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This paper follows a behavioural perspective on boards and governance in exploring the 
influence of board control on corporate innovation in small technology-based firms. An 
analysis of 135 Swedish technology-based firms suggests that board involvement in decision 
control may influence corporate innovation. The empirical results show that board 
involvement in strategic decision control is positively associated with process innovation, 
while board involvement in financial decision control is positively associated with 
organizational innovation. No association is found between board involvement in decision 
control and product innovation. Overall, the findings suggest that board involvement in 
decision control may promote corporate innovation but that different kinds of decision control 
influence different forms of innovation. 
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This paper follows a behavioral perspective on boards and governance in exploring the 
influence of board control on corporate innovation in small technology-based firms. An 
analysis of 135 Swedish technology-based firms suggests that board involvement in 
decision control may influence corporate innovation. The empirical results show that 
board involvement in strategic decision control is positively associated with process 
innovation, while board involvement in financial decision control is positively associated 
with organizational innovation. No association is found between board involvement in 
decision control and product innovation. Overall, the findings suggest that board 
involvement in decision control may promote corporate innovation but that different 
kinds of decision control influence different forms of corporate innovation. 
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Commitment to innovation is becoming increasingly important for the successful 
development and continued competitiveness of small technology-based firms. Innovation 
creates opportunities for expansion, growth and profitability (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse, 
2000) and is often an important way of achieving competitive advantage (Ng, Pearson 
and Ball, 1992; O’Gorman, 1997). Failure to commit energy and effort to innovation-
intense strategies will on the other hand sooner or later make conservative firms squeezed 
out of the market by more proactive organizations (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Bettis and 
Hitt, 1995). A strong commitment to corporate innovation seems consequently crucial for 
the long-term growth and prosperity of small technology- based firms. 
 
The overall aim of this paper is to explore the influence of board control on corporate 
innovation in small technology-based firms. Empirical studies support the argument that 
small firms in general, and technology based firms in particular, can benefit from the 
external oversight that a governing board can offer, for example by directing the firm 
towards appropriate innovative strategies, and in allocating resources to areas necessary 
for responding to changes in the marketplace (Barrow, 2001; Gabrielsson and Huse, 
2002). Smaller firms are in this respect often naïve about planning and the development 
of strategy, sometimes even ignoring essential management activities such as board 
meetings, performance reviews and strategic discussions (Deakins, O’Neill and Mileham, 
2000). An active board of directors could in this respect make sure that business 
strategies meet predetermined goals and objectives and help small technology-based 
firms to focus their efforts and commitment to corporate innovation (Barrow, 2001). 
 
However, despite the reported benefits of increased board involvement in small firms, we 
know very little about whether small technology based firms can actually improve their 
capacity for innovation by having an active board of directors. Board involvement in 
strategy development may for example lead to more formalized decision structures, with 
the risk of reducing the speed and flexibility of organizational decision making. It may   3
moreover restrain the kind of action-oriented culture that characterizes a favorable 
environment for entrepreneurial projects. Hence, the actual effects of board control on 
corporate innovation in small technology based firms remains relatively unexplored, 
despite its importance for both theory and practice. 
 
The present paper contributes to literature and research in several ways. First, the paper 
provides empirical results of the effects of board control on corporate innovation in small 
privately held firms. Studies of the influence of board governance on various firm 
outcomes have primarily been conducted in large firms (Huse, 2000). There is 
consequently almost a near void in our theoretical knowledge of the performance effects 
of board control in small privately held firms. This is surprising since this is a dominant 
form of economic organization in most developed market economies. A better 
understanding of how boards can influence the commitment to corporate innovation in 
smaller firms is therefore of high relevance. Moreover, previous studies have primarily 
used R&D expenditures as a proxy for corporate innovation. Organizational activities 
aimed at innovation are however often informally organized in smaller firms, which 
mean that conventional measures may risk under-estimate their R&D activity (Roper, 
1996). Therefore, to better understand the influences of board control on corporate 
innovation in small technology-based firms this study use conceptualizations of corporate 
innovation from the corporate entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Huse, 1994; Zahra, 1996; 
Zahra et al., 2000). 
 
Second, the paper develops constructs to assess boards’ actual involvement in decision 
control. The developed constructs are based on the theoretical work of Fama and Jensen 
(1983) and Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990). To our knowledge no existing 
operationalizations of board involvement in decision control exists, which makes the 
developed constructs interesting for further research in this area. Thus, following a 
behavioral perspective on boards and governance (Huse, 2005), the paper goes beyond 
the widespread practice of using board compositional measures as proxies for board 
behavior. Despite the widespread recognition that decision control represent one of the 
most fundamental responsibilities of boards (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson, Daily and   4
Ellstrand, 1996) there are surprisingly few empirical studies of this type of board 
behavior (Huse, 2005). Empirical studies have typically not directly assessed board 
involvement in decision control but rather imputed this behavior from observable board 
characteristics, such as board size, representation of outside directors or CEO duality 
(Fiegener, 2005). Our knowledge of to what extent boards are actually involved in 
various types of decision control activities consequently remains limited. Moreover, our 
knowledge of its consequences for corporate innovation is even scarcer. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a literature 
review, where we define the key concepts used in the study and develop our hypotheses. 
Then follows the method section where we present the sample and variables used in the 
study. This is followed by a presentation of the analysis and results. The paper ends with 
a discussion of the findings together with implications. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this paper we aim to explore the influence of board control on corporate innovation in 
small technology-based firms. In this section we will first discuss the concept of 
corporate innovation, followed by a review of studies of boards of directors and decision 
control. Finally we develop our hypotheses of how board control can be expected to 
influence corporate innovation in small technology-based firms.  
 
Corporate innovation 
Corporate innovation is generally seen as the result of novel and creative combinations of 
knowledge and resources (Schumpeter, 1934; Penrose, 1959; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Often it is associated with the introduction of new products or services in different 
markets. Innovation is however a broad concept that has been conceived in a variety of 
ways in previous research. Innovations can for example assume many other forms, such 
as new production methods or new organizational systems and structures (Damanpour, 
1991; Utterbach, 1996). In this study we recognize corporate innovation as a 
multidimensional concept which consists of a full range of organizational activities that   5
promote long-term value-creation (Garcia and Callantone, 2002). More precisely, we 
conceptualize corporate innovation as consisting of product as well as process and 
organizational forms of innovation (Zahra et al, 2000). Product innovation refers to the 
introduction of goods or services that are new or substantially improved. Process 
innovation refers to the implementation of a new or significantly improved production or 
delivery method within the firm or across a supply chain. Organizational innovation 
refers to the creation or alteration of business structures, practices, and systems in order 
to support innovation and creativity. 
 
It is widely acknowledged that sustained competitive advantage in small technology-
based firms result from their ability to continuously innovate. The capability to develop 
and commercialize new products and technologies has for example been associated with 
improved survival chances and superior performance (McCann, 1991; Keeley and Roure, 
1990).  Moreover, by adopting new technologies and establishing novel organizational 
structures and systems small technology-based firms can better improve their methods of 
production and replenish their competencies (Markman, Balkin and Schjoedt, 2001). As 
such, successful innovation can be said to represent the very “lifeblood” of small 
technology-based firms, significantly increasing their ability to compete vigorously, 
create new revenue streams and renew its operations. 
 
Boards of directors and decision control 
The centrality of board decision making in guiding organizational action is an established 
conception in literature on corporate governance. According to this view the board of 
directors operates at the apex of the organization with a considerable potential to 
influence the direction and performance of the enterprise (Mintzberg, 1983; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). One of the most fundamental ways for boards to influence the direction 
and performance of the enterprise is through “decision control”, encompassing 
involvement in board activities such as performing high-level reviews of strategic plans, 
evaluating past decisions, and monitoring executive and firm performance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Johnson et al., 1996; Fiegener, 2005). Hence, 
by being involved in decision control the board can add value to the firm by providing   6
external oversight, assist the CEO in determining objectives, and in bringing special 
expertise in matters of strategic importance. 
 
Effective board control ought to cover aspects that are relevant for the existence of an 
organization and the means by which it achieves success and growth. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) discuss a theoretical base for board involvement in strategic decision making 
where the purpose is to reduce agency costs and maximize the value creative potential of 
the enterprise. In their discussion Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that managers should be 
involved in initiating and implementing corporate strategies, while the board of directors 
should be involved in ratifying these decisions, and then to continuously monitor the 
implementation and performance of the decisions. The initiation and implementation of 
strategic decisions is in their framework called decision management (a managerial task), 
while the ratification and monitoring of strategic decisions is called decision control (a 
task for the board of directors). By doing this, boards of directors can delegate decision 
management to agents with valuable relevant knowledge (the executive managers) while 
limiting their potential self-interest behavior in situations where their goals may be in 
conflict with the long-term development of the firm. 
 
Theory and research in corporate governance generally emphasize the problems of 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and executive managers in large publicly held 
corporations. Small firms are in this respect often contrasted as small and non-complex 
organizations characterized either by decision making and residual risk bearing residing 
in one and the same person, or with close relationships between owners and managers 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Schulze et al, 2001). The close relationship between ownership 
and management is considered to naturally align the interests about growth opportunities 
and risk, which in turn reduces the need to maintain “costly” governance mechanisms to 
monitor managerial and firm performance. Small firms are hence not assumed to have 
any problems of conflicting interests that can reduce the value creative potential of an 
enterprise. This widespread assumption has however recently been challenged by several 
researches. Owner-managers may for example lack either the time or the vision to take 
calculated risks and make necessary long-term investments to stimulate entrepreneurial   7
projects (O’Gorman, 2000). They may also have difficulties in securing alternative 
employment as their firm-specific skills may have less value elsewhere (Schulze et al, 
2001). Owner-managers may moreover have access to superior information regarding the 
resources and performance of the enterprise and can consequently take advantage of this 
information asymmetry for their own purposes, which in turn can cut back the returns for 
other stakeholders (Markman et al., 2001). Owner-managers may in this respect take 
decisions that do not maximize the long-term value of the firm due to the un-diversified 
nature of their human and financial capital, and instead choose to divert resources to 
projects or goals with shorter payback periods. Non-economic preferences and self-
control problems could hence lead to managerial decisions and actions that do not 
advance the common (economic) good (Schulze et al, 2001). These potential problems 
may in turn lead to demands for increased board oversight in technology-based small 
firms. 
 
Board control and corporate innovation 
Small technology-based firms must continually develop and exploit new sources of 
competitive advantage in order to create new asset combinations that are valuable and 
unique. A major challenge for corporate boards is thus to direct attention towards the 
exploration of new possibilities and alternatives that sustain or even enhance the long-
term competitive position of the firm (Taylor, 2001). However, the choice to organize 
such efforts can be subject to severe tensions between competing demands for short-term 
cash generation and long-term value creation. Technology-based firms base their activity 
mainly on the exploitation and refinement of advanced technological knowledge (Autio 
and Yli-Renko, 1998), while corporate innovation instead requires a strong emphasis on 
the exploration of new possibilities and alternatives. There is consequently a risk that this 
tension works in favor for the refinement and extension of existing competencies and 
technologies, where exhibiting returns are more certain. This, in turn, may prevent the 
discovery of new innovative opportunities, and at the same time stifle the potential for 
future exploitation (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; Holmqvist, 2004). 
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In this paper, we recognize the board of directors as a potential decision making body 
with the discretion to deploy organizational resources and initiate innovative projects. 
Research on organizational control systems generally recognizes two types of control that 
may impact the innovative potential of an enterprise: financial and strategic controls (e.g., 
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 
1990). Financial controls are clear and unambiguous, which provides an opportunity to 
agree on objective performance standards well in advance of any performance evaluation. 
The use of objective financial criteria related to the organizational budget simplifies 
evaluation procedures. It also introduces a high degree of discipline into the control 
process and can to some extent enhance precision in decision making. However, 
performance assessments based on objective financial criteria’s are often unable to 
account for information that is difficult to quantify, and are also often based on short-
term rather than long-term performance dimensions. These factors may hence be 
particularly beneficial to firms that do not have as salient a need to encourage creativity 
and innovation (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999). 
 
Strategic controls are on the other hand based on strategically relevant criteria related to 
markets, customers and products, as opposed to objective financial information. As such, 
this type of performance assessment highlights the need to recognize the long-term 
dimensions of business enterprise, such as reviewing product/service quality controls and 
customer satisfaction criteria, and also the need to be responsive to the natural 
environment, to the individuals it employs and to the community in which the firm 
operates (Wing and Dewhirst, 1992). Strategic controls also facilitate an organizational 
climate with more open reporting of firm data and increased  willingness to share 
sensitive information, which in turn can provide a more constructive alternative to 
traditional hierarchical control. Hence, as strategic controls are more capable of 
facilitating innovation and creativity (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999), they can be 
expected to be more consistent with supporting entrepreneurial processes. 
 
Based on the discussion above, we expect boards who are highly involved in strategic 
decision control to also be highly committed to corporate innovation. For boards who are   9
highly involved in financial decision control we expect the opposite relationship. This 
leads to the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1: Board involvement in financial decision control is negatively associated with 
corporate innovation in technology-based firms.  
 
H2: Board involvement in strategic decision control is positively associated with 





To design an appropriate sample we selected firms in three technology-based industry 
sectors: manufacturing of electronic machines and components, manufacturing of 
electronic communication equipment, and manufacturing of optics/medicine/photo. We 
then followed the standard definition for small firms in the European Union as having 
between 10 and 50 employees. We only selected privately held firms, and excluded 
proprietorships and partnerships as they are not legally required to have a board of 
directors. Our selection criteria led to an initial sample of 451 technology-based firms. 
Mail addresses to the firms were collected from SCB’s (Statistic Sweden’s) register over 
Swedish companies. The questionnaires were mailed in early spring 2000, and were 
addressed to the CEO. A control question was included in the questionnaire to verify that 
it was the CEO that answered the questions. After two reminders we received 135 




The firms in our final sample represent a broad cross-section of technology-based firms. 
The mean age of the firms in our sample was 24.8 years. The average total sales in 1999 
were 30.5 million SEK, which corresponds to approximately 3.37 million EURO. The 
mean number of employees was 24.5 (median 20). About one third (36.3%) of the firms   10
operated mainly on the Swedish domestic market, while about one fifth of the firms 
(18.9%) could be considered international firms with more than 3/4 of their sales derived 
from export activities. In nearly 2/3 (62%) of the firms was the founder still active in an 
executive position (primarily as the CEO), or as a board member. In about 2/3 of the 
firms were executive managers also major owners, controlling 51% or more of the total 
stock. The average level of executive ownership was 69.2%. 
 
The mean size of the board was 3.7 board members (median 3.3). About 1/5 of the firms 
(19.4%) had less than three board members
1, while approximately half of the firms 
(49.2%) had four or more board members. The maximum number was seven board 
members. The average number of outside board members (board members who are 
neither employed as managers nor family members or relatives to the CEO) was 1.5 
(median 1). About 43.3% of the firms had no outside board members, while 43.7% of the 
firms had two or more outside board members. 
 
Measures 
Survey data were used to construct measures of corporate innovation and board decision 
control as follows: 
 
Corporate innovation 
Responses to survey items were used to construct measures of corporate innovation. 
Using a 5-point scale, respondents rated their firm’s actual emphasis on each item. To 
develop measures for innovation, 12 survey items were subjected to factor analysis with 
varimax rotation. These survey items were taken from Huse (1994). The factor analysis 
produced three significant factors: product innovation (4 items), process innovation (5 
items), and organizational innovation (3 items). Each factor has an eigenvalues over 1 
and, together, the three factors explained 70.0% of the variance. Based on the analysis, 
we created innovation measures using multi-item indices where average scores of the 
items in each of the three factors were used in the analyses. Each innovation index had an 
                                                 
1 Swedish Company Law requires firms to have at least three registered board members. Privately held firms can however circumvent 
this requirement and choose to have 1-2 board members, if at least one substitute director is registered.    11
acceptable Cronbach α ranging between .78 and .90. Detailed report of the factor analysis 
can be found in the appendix in table 3. 
 
Board decision control 
In line with our frame of reference, board involvement in decision control was divided 
into two dimensions: financial decision control and strategic decision control. These 
items were based on the theoretical work of Fama and Jensen (1983) and on the 
discussion in Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990). A 5-point scale consisting of 6 items was 
developed to gauge board involvement in financial and strategic decision control 
respectively. A factor analysis using varimax rotation was conducted to validate the two 
scales. The items loaded significantly on the expected factors with eigenvalues exceeding 
1.0, and combined these two factors explained 68.0 % of the variance. This procedure led 
to that financial decision control was measured as the mean of 3 items (α =.75), and 
strategic decision control was measured as the mean of 3 items (α =.76). Detailed report 
of the factor analysis can be found in the appendix in table 4. 
 
Control variables 
Three variables were included as statistical controls in the analysis because of their 
potential impact on corporate innovation in technology-based firms: 1) environmental 
dynamism, 2) firm age, and 3) past firm performance. 
 
Environmental dynamism. The first control variable measures the dynamism in the 
operating environment of the firm. Environmental dynamism refers to the continuity of 
changes in the firm’s environment (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse, 1997). These changes can 
arise from many sources, including complex technological development as well as 
changes in the regulatory or competitive landscapes. Highly dynamic environments are 
generally expected to encourage innovation and entrepreneurial behaviour, but also to 
intensify rivalry by encouraging new firm entry into the market (Miller, 1983; Covin and 
Slevin, 1989). We therefore expect dynamic environments to be positively associated 
with corporate innovation. The perceived level of dynamism was measured by the mean   12
of 5 items on a Likert-type scale (α = .71). These items were taken from Zahra et al. 
(1997). 
 
Firm age. The second control variable was firm age. This variable was included as 
younger firms are more likely to innovate than older firms (Acs and Preston, 1997). 
Hence, we expect a negative association between firm age and the firm’s commitment to 
take an entrepreneurial orientation. Firm age was measured as the number of years that 
has past since the firm was founded. 
 
Past firm performance. Finally we included a control variable that measured the firms’ 
past performance. When a firm performs well it creates slack resources that may be used 
for innovation and new venturing activities (Cyert and March, 1963; Zahra et al., 2000). 
The measure we used was return on sales (ROS), the firm’s total sales divided by its 
equity. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 
As we have metric dependent variables and several metric or dichotomous independent 
variables multiple regression analysis can be expected as an appropriate statistical 
technique (Hair et al., 1998). Table 1 presents means, standard deviations and 
correlations among the variables used in the regression analyses. Table 2 presents the 
regression analysis. 
   13
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlations 
 
    Mean  Std.dev  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1.  Product  innovation  3.29  .96 - - - - - - - 
2.  Process  innovation  3.04  1.0  .59**  - - - - - - 
3.  Organizational  innovation  3.55  .79  .43*  .55**  - - - - - 
4.Strategic decision control  3.31  .93  .16  .25**  .18  -  -  -  - 
5. Financial decision control  3.77  1.00  -.01  .16  .25**  .17  -  -  - 
6. Environmental dynamism  3.05  .66  .30*  .35**  .23*  .09  -.01  -  - 
7. Firm age  24.8  17.8  .13  .16  .00  .04  .00  -.19*  - 
8. Past firm performance  -.54  30.3  -.05  -.15  -.07  -.04  -.17  .03  -.23* 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed)        
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed)        
 
Table 2. Regression analysis 
 
  Product Process  Organizational 
   innovation innovation  innovation 
  β  β  β 
           
Environmental dynamism  .29**  .40**  .22* 
Firm age  .13  .16  .00 
Past firm performance  -.03  -.11  -.04 
Financial decision control -.04  .12  .25* 
Strategic decision control  .15  .18*  .10 
R
2  .13 .26  .14 
Adj R
2  ..08 .22  .10 
F (F-sign)  2.9* 6.9**  3.2** 
The table reports partial standardized coefficients (β), multiple R, R
2,   
adjusted R
2 and significance level * p < .05,  ** p < .01     
 
As can be seen in table 2 our regression model only show minor support for the 
hypotheses developed in the literature review. Our first hypothesis was that board 
involvement in financial decision control is negatively associated with corporate 
innovation. In this case, we did not find any association between financial decision 
control and product or process innovation. Moreover, contrary to our initial expectations   14
we found a positive association between board involvement in financial decision control 
and organizational innovation. Hypothesis 1 was consequently not supported.  
 
Our second hypothesis was that board involvement in strategic decision control is 
positively associated with corporate innovation. In this case, we did not find any 
association between strategic decision control and product innovation. Neither could we 
found any association between strategic decision control and organizational innovation. 
However, the results from our analysis show that board involvement in strategic decision 
control is positively associated with process innovation. Hypothesis 2 was consequently 
partly supported. 
 
Table 2 also shows that the statistical control variable environmental dynamism have a 
positive and significant association with all innovation measures. This finding 
corresponds to previous studies that have found that the external environment is a main 
predictor of a firm’s innovative behavior (Miller, 1983; Zahra, 1996). Moreover, it 
indicates that firms in dynamic environments tend to put a significantly higher emphasis 
on innovation-intensive strategies to meet the complexity of rapid change that these firms 
face. The level of environmental dynamism should hence be taken into account in future 
studies of corporate innovation in small firms, as the external environment seems to 
frame the actions the firm is aiming to undertake (Boyd, Dess and Rasheed, 1993). 
 
V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
This study has explored the influence of board control on corporate innovation in small 
technology-based firms. Corporate innovation was conceptualized as consisting of 
product, process and organizational forms of innovation. Board control was 
conceptualized as board involvement in the ratification and monitoring stages of strategic 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Based on literature and research on organizational 
control (e.g., Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Hitt et al., 
1990), we further divided decision control into two dimensions: financial and strategic 
decision control. A review of literature and research suggested a negative association   15
between board involvement in financial decision control and corporate innovation. We 
also expected a positive association between board involvement in strategic decision 
control and corporate innovation. Statistical analysis of a sample of 135 Swedish small 
technology-based firms showed only partial support for our initial hypotheses. There was 
no association between board involvement in financial control and product and process 
innovation. There was however a significant positive association between financial 
control and organizational innovation, which was contrary to what we expected. 
Moreover, we did found a positive association between board involvement in strategic 
decision control and process innovation. However, we did not find any significant 
association between board involvement in strategic decision control and product or 
organizational innovation. The overall findings show that board involvement in decision 
control has an impact on corporate innovation in small technology-based firms, but that 
different kinds of decision control influence different forms of corporate innovation. A 
more detailed discussion of the findings will now follow to develop the discussion of the 
empirical results together with suggestions for future research. 
 
Financial board control and corporate innovation 
The main problem of applying financial principles and methods of assessment and 
control to innovation is often seen as that of dealing with the unknown (Wilson, 1975; see 
also McGrath and Macmillan, 1995). There was however no support for our first 
hypothesis that higher board involvement in financial control should be negatively 
associated with corporate innovation. On the contrary, we found a positive association 
between financial board control and organizational innovation. The result is very 
interesting, not at least as financial controls generally are expected to discourage a 
creative and innovative organizational culture (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999). Hence, 
contrary to what we expected, by being involved in financial decision control boards in 
small technology-based firms seem to play an important role in influencing the design of 
organizational systems aimed to support innovative activities. 
 
In planning financial controls for innovation it has been argued that “petty accounting” 
should be avoided (Wilson, 1975; Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Our choice of a rather   16
broad conception of financial control, encompassing board involvement in the ratification 
and monitoring stages of decisions related to the organizational budget, liquidity, equity 
and ownership, may explain parts of the result. Increased board involvement in this kind 
of financial control may here instead generate increased potentialities for slack resources, 
which in turn can be put on human resource policies and administrative structures aimed 
at stimulating organizational learning and experimentation (Hill and Stewart, 2000). 
Another potential explanation for our findings can be that the problems of allocating 
different proportions of the organizational budget across different departments and 
multiple product lines that exist in large diversified corporations (Bower, 1986) may not 
be so apparent in small technology based firms. Small firms have for example a less 
complex organization than larger diversified corporations, and they usually also operate 
in fewer product markets and in more local geographic areas (O’Gorman, 2000). This 
means a slimmer organization with a more narrow focus, which can make it easier to 
decide how to allocate resources to promote organizational systems that encourage 
innovation and creativity among employees.  However, these are merely speculations 
which provide several avenues to explore the nature of the control and organizational 
innovation in future research. 
 
Strategic board control and corporate innovation 
Strategic controls are generally expected to encourage corporate innovation (Hoskisson 
and Hitt, 1988; Hitt et al., 1990; Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999). Accordingly, our second 
hypothesis was that increased board involvement in strategic control is positively 
associated with corporate innovation. In our regression model there was only partial 
support for this hypothesis. What we found was a positive and significant association 
between strategic board control and process innovation. The findings imply that boards in 
small technology-based firms can play an important role in influencing the development 
of novel production and operation strategies aimed at making the organization’s 
production as effective and efficient as possible. Hence, boards that are highly involved 
in strategic control facilitate new process technology to enhance the business process and 
ultimately competitive advantage and profitability. 
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Our findings may cast some interesting light on the role of the board in supporting the 
innovation process in small technology-based firms. A high emphasis on process 
innovation could intuitively be expected as an alternative to product innovation. For 
example, while launching new products can put a firm ahead of its competitors and 
enable the charge of premium prices, the development of novel process technologies may 
instead lead to lower costs due to gains in productivity, material utilization and output 
reliability (O’Gorman, 2000). However, as can be seen in the correlation matrix, product 
and process innovation are highly correlated with each other in our sample (r = .59). This 
means that  the development of new products most often go hand-in-hand with 
investments in new process technology development. Small technology based firms that 
renew or diversify their product ranges may hence also need to update process 
technology to be able to make the different types of new products. The board of directors 
seems in this respect to promote the introduction of new products by overseeing that the 
production equipment will support the introduction of the new product range. 
 
Board involvement in financial vs. strategic decision control 
An additional issue that can be worth mentioning is that there is no significant correlation 
between board involvement in financial and strategic decision control. This implies that 
most boards are not equally involved in financial and strategic control. Rather, we can 
expect that the actual involvement in financial vs. strategic board control will mirror the 
concerns and interests of the dominant coalition, or at least represent some compromise 
among competing coalitions (Cyert and March, 1963; Mintzberg, 1983). What is 
interesting is that although it is well accepted in contemporary theories of organizations 
that bargaining and trade-offs characterize organizational decision making, it seems less 
well recognized that negotiating processes also characterizes major decisions of boards of 
directors. Rather, most organizational and economic theorists have viewed corporate 
boards as guided by a rational optimizing decision-making behavior untouched by 
political processes in and around the boardroom (Ocasio, 1999). In a behavioral 
perspective, however, the position of the board in allocating attention and resources 
cannot always be regarded as non-problematic (Huse, 2005). Instead, in any business 
organization various coalitions of actors can be expected to compete for influence over   18
decisions and allocation of resources such as the organizational budget (Cyert and March, 
1963; Bower, 1986). Hence, the emphasis on various forms of decision control in the 
boardroom can be described as a matter of trade offs between the often-competing goals 
and objectives of organizational actors. How various coalitions in and around the 
boardroom actually influence board involvement in financial vs. strategic decision 
control is however a largely unexplored issue, which deserves further scholarly attention. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
 
The increasing globalization of markets and rapid technological progress has exerted 
concurrent pressures for small technology-based firms to increase their profits by 
devoting resources to corporate innovation. A growing body of research suggests that a 
strong and vigilant board can have a significant impact on a firm’s innovative activities 
(Hill and Snell, 1988; Baysinger et al., 1991; Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000). Following 
this stream of research, the aim of this paper has been to explore the influence of board 
control on corporate innovation in a sample of small technology-based firms. Overall, the 
findings suggest that board involvement in decision control may promote corporate 
innovation, but that different kinds of decision control influence different forms of 
corporate innovation. Hence, the findings indicate that the board of directors can be seen 
as a potential resource that can promote corporate innovation in small technology-based 
firms by bringing discipline and rigor to the strategic planning process. 
   19
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 3. Factor analysis of innovation measures 
 






Being the first company in the industry to introduce  new products  .75  .43 .09 
Creating new products for fast market introductions  .68  .36 .24 
Creating new variations to existing product lines  .78  -.07 .20 
Increasing the revenue from new products less than 3 years old  .73  .35 .06 
Being the first company in the industry to introduce new technology  .21  .84  .14 
Being the first company in the industry to introduce technological improvements  .24  .78  .27 
Creating innovative technologies  .14  .84  .23 
Investing heavily in cutting edge process technology-oriented R&D  .14  .68  .36 
Developing radically new technology  .27  .76  .20 
Developing systems that encourage initiatives and creativity among employees  .14  .20  .80 
Encouraging innovation in the organization  .11  .30  .84 
Supporting an organizational unit that drive innovation   .19  .20  .72 
Eigenvalue  1.36 5.83  1.22 
% of variance explained  11.30  48.56  10.15 
Cronbach  .81 .90  .78 
1Items follow a 5-pointscale (1 = very low emphasis vs. 5 = very high emphasis)       
2Absolute loadings of .50 or higher are significant       
 
 
Table 4. Factor analysis of board control measures 
 





Involvement in the ratification and monitoring stage of     
strategic decisions related to…    
…the organizational budget  .75  .18 
…equity capital and ownership  .84  -.08 
…liquidity and finance  .86  .09 
…marketing .32  .76 
…customers -.05  .87 
…products .01  .77 
Eigenvalue 2.41  1.69 
% of variance explained  40.15  28.16 
Cronbach .75  .76 
1Items follow a 5-point scale (1 = very low emphasis vs. 5 = very high 
emphasis)    
2Absolute loadings of .50 or higher are significant    
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